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SJD/RS PROGRAM

MICHIGAN LAW 2017

YOUNG SCHOLARS’

CONFERENCE
Co-sponsored by the Michigan Journal of International Law,
the Michigan Journal of Law Reform, the Michigan Journal of Gender and Law,
the Michigan Journal of Race and Law, and the Michigan Telecommunications
and Technology Law Review

MARCH 31–APRIL 1, 2017

FRIDAY, MARCH 31, 2017 (120 Hutchins Hall)
7:45 – 8:30 AM

Registration and Continental Breakfast

8:30 – 8:40 AM

Greetings (Professor Daniel Halberstam, Associate Dean for Faculty and
Research, UM Law School)

8:40 – 9:00 AM

Keynote speaker (Professor Mathias Reimann, Hessel E. Yntema
Professor of Law, UM Law School)

09:00 – 10:30 AM

Panel I – Between the Public and the Private
Faculty Discussant: Professor Daniel Crane (UM Law School)
Moderator: Nir Fishbien (SJD Candidate, UM Law School)
•
•

William J. Moon (NYU): “Private Ordering of Public Law”
Deepa Das Acevedo (The University of Pennsylvania Law School):
“We the Working People”

10:30 – 10:40 AM

Coffee Break

10:40 – 12:10 PM

Panel II – Public Law
Faculty Discussant: Professor Julian Davis Mortenson (UM Law School)
Moderator: Aviram Shahal (SJD Candidate, UM Law School)
•
•
•

Noah Rosenblum (Columbia University): “Making Presidential
Democracy: Revisiting the Executive Reorganization Act of 1937”
Sarah Light (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania):
“Advisory Preemption”
Andrew Keane Woods (University of Kentucky, Visiting professor University of Texas): “The Transperency Tax”

12:10 – 1:30 PM

Lunch (Lawyers’ Club)

1:30 – 1:45 PM

Short Tour (leaves from Lawyers’ Club)

1:45 – 3:15 PM

Panel III – International and European Law
Faculty Discussant: Professor Donald Regan (UM Law School)
Moderator: Jing Geng (Grotius Research Scholar, UM Law School)
•

Thomas Verellen (University of Leuven, Michigan Law School):
“Federalism and Foreign Relations in the United States and the
European Union: Hierarchy versus Pluralism”
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•
•

Giacomo Tagiuri (Bocconi University, NYU): “The Cultural
Implications of Market Regulation: Does the EU Destroy the Texture
of National Life?"
Vera Shikhelman (NYU): “Access to Justice in the United Nations
Human Rights Committee”

3:15 – 3:30 PM

Coffee Break

3:30 – 5:00 PM

Panel IV – Law and Society
Faculty Discussant: Professor Sherman Clark (UM Law School)
Moderator: Tami Groswald Ozery (SJD Candidate, UM Law School)
•
•
•

7:30 PM

Andrea Freeman (University of Hawai'i, UC Berkeley - visiting
professor): " Unmothering Black Women: Formula Feeding and the
Legacy of Slavery”
Doron Dorfman (Stanford): “The Fear of 'Disability Con':
Backlash and Mistrust in the Shadow of the Law”
Karin Carmit Yefet (University of Haifa): “Divorce as a Gender
Equality Right”

Dinner (Mélange Bistro – 312 South Main St.)
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SATURDAY, APRIL 1, 2017 (1225 South Hall)
8:30 – 9:00 AM

Continental Breakfast

9:00 – 10:30 AM

Panel V – Empirical Legal Research
Faculty Discussant: Professor J J Prescott (UM Law School)
Moderator: Orli Oren-Kolbinger (Grotius Research Scholar, UM Law
School)
•
•
•

Monika Leszczyńska (NYU): “Think Twice Before you Sign! An
Experiment on the Cautionary Function of Contractual Formalities”
Emily Satterthwaite (University of Toronto): “Eentrepreneurs’ Legal
Status Choices and the C Corporation Survival Penalty”
Greg Buchak (University of Chicago): “Does Competition Reduce
Racial Discrimination in Lending?”

10:30 – 10:45 AM

Coffee Break

10:45 – 12:15 PM

Panel VI – Law and Technology
Faculty Discussant: Professor Margo Schlanger (UM Law School)
Moderator: Stavros Makris (Grotius Research Scholar, UM Law School)
•
•
•

12:15 – 1:00 PM

Emily Berman (University of Houston): “When Database Queries are
Fourth Amendment Searches”
Asaf Lubin (Yale Law School): “'We only Spy on Foreigners': The
Myth of a Universal Right to Privacy and the Practice of Mass
Extraterritorial Surveillance”
Yoni Har Carmel (Haifa University): “Reshaping Ability Grouping
Through Big Data”

Lunch
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1:00 – 2:30 PM

Panel VII – International Law
Faculty Discussant: Professor Steven Ratner (UM Law School)
Moderator: Yahli Shereshevsky (Grotius Research Scholar, UM Law
School)
•
•
•

2:30 – 3:00 PM

David Hughes (Osgood Hall Law School): “The Development and Use
of Informal Complementarity”
Chris O'Meara (UCL): “The Relationship Between National, Unit and
Personal Self-Defence in International Law: Bridging the Disconnect”
Michael Da Silva (University of Toronto): “The International Right to
Health Care: A Legal and Moral Defense”

Closing Remarks
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Sherman J. Clark
Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law
Sherman J. Clark, the Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, joined the Michigan Law faculty in
1995 and teaches courses on torts, evidence, and sports law. His current research focuses on the
ways in which legal rules and institutions may have an impact on character, and thus on the
extent to which we thrive. Law and politics, Professor Clark believes, can have an impact—often
indirect and inadvertent, but real—on the kind of people we become; and that, in turn, can have
an impact—difficult to describe and quantify, but potentially profound—on how well and fully
we are able to live. In this vein, drawing on classical philosophy, modern positive psychology,
political theory, literature, and law, he has written about institutions and practices ranging from
direct democracy to the jury to criminal procedure. Professor Clark is also interested in legal
education, and seeks to reject the false dichotomy between practical and theoretical ways of
approaching the study of law—between pragmatic professional training and humane liberal
education. He has argued that being a good lawyer and being thoughtful about the law are not
opposites, or even things to be balanced, but are rather things that can and ought to go hand in
hand. In addition to his teaching and research interests, Professor Clark served as an adviser to
lawyers for Wayne County, Michigan, and the City of Detroit in their efforts to hold gun
manufacturers liable for allegedly negligent distribution practices. The legal theory he
articulated, known as willful blindness, focused on the manufacturers' alleged knowing
exploitation of a thriving secondary market in the indirect sale of firearms to felons and minors.
He is a graduate of Towson State University and Harvard Law School, and practiced in
Washington, D.C., with the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis.

Daniel Crane
Frederick Paul Furth Sr. Professor of Law
Daniel Crane is the Frederick Paul Furth Sr. Professor of Law. He served as the associate dean
for faculty and research from 2013 to 2016. He teaches Contracts, Antitrust, Antitrust and
Intellectual Property, and Legislation and Regulation. He previously was a professor of law at
Yeshiva University's Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law and a visiting professor at New York
University School of Law and the University of Chicago Law School. In spring 2009, he taught
antitrust law on a Fulbright Scholarship at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa in Lisbon.
Professor Crane's work has appeared in the University of Chicago Law Review, the California
Law Review, the Michigan Law Review, the Georgetown Law Journal, and the Cornell Law
Review, among other journals. He is the author of several books on antitrust law, including
Antitrust (Aspen, 2014), The Making of Competition Policy: Legal and Economic Sources
(Oxford University Press, 2013), and The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement
(Oxford University Press, 2011).

5

Daniel Halberstam
Associate Dean for Faculty and Research
Eric Stein Collegiate Professor of Law
Director, European Legal Studies Program
Daniel Halberstam, the Eric Stein Collegiate Professor of Law and associate dean for faculty and
research, teaches and writes about U.S. constitutional law, European Union law, comparative
constitutional law, and global governance. An internationally recognized expert on constitutional
law and federalism, and one of the principal architects of the theory of constitutional pluralism,
he writes more generally about comparative public law and legal theory.
Professor Halberstam was founding director of the University's EU Center in 2000, and
continues to serve as director of the Law School's European Legal Studies Program. He lectures
regularly throughout Europe, holding a position as external professor in the European Law
Department at the College of Europe, Bruges. Professor Halberstam was a fellow at the Institute
for Advanced Study (Wissenschaftskolleg), Berlin, and now serves on the Institute's advisory
board. He also serves on several advisory editorial boards, including the Common Market Law
Review.
In 2012, Professor Halberstam delivered the General Course on the European Union at the
European University Institute in Florence, Italy. In 2013, he was named chair of the faculty
advisory board of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public and International Law,
Heidelberg. In 2014, Professor Halberstam co-organized and chaired substantive discussions at a
joint meeting in Luxembourg of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the U.S.
Supreme Court. In 2015, he co-organized and chaired a closed-door working group in Berlin of
high-level European policymakers and officials on EU accession to the European Convention on
Human Rights.
Professor Halberstam joined the Michigan Law faculty from the U.S. Department of Justice,
where he served in the Office of Legal Counsel during the Clinton administration. He holds a BA
(mathematics and psychology), summa cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa, from Columbia College,
and a JD from Yale Law School, where he was a Coker Fellow for Constitutional Law and
articles editor of the Yale Law Journal. Professor Halberstam served as attorney-adviser to
Federal Trade Commission Chairman Robert Pitofsky, and clerked for the Hon. Patricia Wald of
the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, and for U.S. Supreme Court Justice
David H. Souter. He also was a judicial fellow for Judge Peter Jann at the European Court of
Justice.

Julian Davis Mortenson
Professor of Law
An engaged scholar and award-winning teacher, Julian Davis Mortenson specializes in
constitutional and transnational law. His research focuses on the allocation of public authority in
both international and domestic governance, frequently from a historical perspective. He
currently serves as coauthor of the Contemporary Practice of the United States section of the
American Journal of International Law.
6

Professor Mortenson is active in both international arbitration and domestic constitutional
litigation. He was lead counsel on a team that recently secured a permanent injunction requiring
Michigan to recognize the marriages of more than 300 same-sex couples. He also has served as
arbitrator, counsel, and expert witness in commercial and investor-state disputes under the ICC,
ICSID, UNCITRAL, and VIAC rules, and has litigated complex transnational matters in the U.S.
courts, including actions involving the enforcement of foreign law and foreign judgments. Other
representative matters include his work as one of the principal drafters of the merits briefs in the
landmark case Boumediene v. Bush, which secured the right of Guantanamo detainees to
challenge their incarceration, and his representation of discharged military service members
challenging the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" law prior to its congressional repeal.
Before joining the faculty, Professor Mortenson worked at the law firm WilmerHale, in the
President's Office of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and as a law
clerk for both Justice David H. Souter of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Hon. J. Harvie
Wilkinson III of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Prior to law school, he was a
management consultant with a client portfolio spanning the finance, manufacturing, oil and gas,
and information technology industries. Professor Mortenson was salutatorian of his class at
Stanford Law School and received an AB in history, summa cum laude, from Harvard College.
He is a Life Member of Clare Hall, Cambridge.

J.J. Prescott
Professor of Law
Codirector, Empirical Legal Studies Center
Codirector, Program in Law and Economics
J.J. Prescott's research interests revolve around criminal law, sentencing law and reform,
employment law, and the dynamics of civil litigation, particularly settlement. Much of his work
is empirical in focus. Current projects include an examination of the ramifications of post-release
sex offender laws, a study of the socio-economic consequences of criminal record expungement,
an evaluation of the effects of prosecutorial discretion and decision-making on short- and longterm defendant outcomes, and an investigation into the nature and repercussions of partial
settlements in civil litigation. In addition, Professor Prescott is the principal investigator of the
U-M Online Court Project, which uses technology to help people facing warrants, fines, and
minor charges resolve their disputes with the government and courts online and without the need
to hire an attorney. Professor Prescott earned his JD, magna cum laude, in 2002 from Harvard
Law School, where he was the treasurer (Vol. 115) and an editor of the Harvard Law Review.
After clerking for the Hon. Merrick B. Garland on the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of
Columbia Circuit, he went on to earn a PhD in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology in 2006.
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Steven R. Ratner
Bruno Simma Collegiate Professor of Law
Steven R. Ratner, the Bruno Simma Collegiate Professor of Law, came to Michigan Law in 2004
from the University of Texas School of Law. His teaching and research focus on public
international law and on a range of challenges facing governments and international institutions
since the Cold War, including territorial disputes, counter-terrorism strategies, ethnic conflict,
state and corporate duties regarding foreign investment, and accountability for human rights
violations. Professor Ratner has written and lectured extensively on the law of war, and also is
interested in the intersection of international law and moral philosophy and other theoretical
issues. A member of the board of editors of the American Journal of International Law from
1998 to 2008, he began his legal career as an attorney-adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser
at the U.S. State Department. In 1998–1999, he was appointed by the UN secretary-general to a
three-person group of experts to consider options for bringing the Khmer Rouge to justice, and
he has since advised governments, NGOs, and international organizations on a range of
international law issues. In 2008–2009, he served in the legal division of the International
Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva. Since 2009, he has served on the State Department's
Advisory Committee on International Law and since 2013, he has been an adviser to the
American Law Institute for the Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States. In 2010–2011, he was a member of the UN's three-person Panel of Experts on
Accountability in Sri Lanka, which advised Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on human rights
violations related to the end of the Sri Lankan civil war. He also has served as an expert on
international investment law in various arbitrations. He established and directs the Law School's
externship program in Geneva. Professor Ratner holds a JD from Yale, an MA (diplôme) from
the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales (Geneva), and an AB from Princeton.

Donald H. Regan
William W. Bishop Jr. Collegiate Professor of Law
Donald H. Regan, the William W. Bishop Jr. Collegiate Professor of Law, is also a professor of
philosophy at the University of Michigan. He teaches and writes about international trade law,
particularly the impact of trade law on national health, safety, and environmental regulation; on
moral and political philosophy, with a special interest in the theory of the good; and on
constitutional law, concentrating on federalism issues. Professor Regan has been a member of
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences since 1998, and has been a Guggenheim Fellow, a
fellow at the National Center for the Humanities, and a visiting fellow at All Souls College,
Oxford. His book, Utilitarianism and Co-operation, shared the Franklin J. Matchette Prize of the
American Philosophical Association for 1979–1980. Professor Regan is a graduate of Harvard
and the University of Virginia Law School. He was also a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University,
where he earned a degree in economics, and he has a PhD in philosophy from the University of
Michigan. Professor Regan began his academic teaching career at Michigan in 1968. He has
visited at the University of California, Berkeley, the University of Virginia, and the University of
Zagreb. Currently, he teaches a seminar on the philosophy of free trade in the master's program
in Law in a European and Global Context at the Catholic University of Portugal (Lisbon).
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Mathias W. Reimann
Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law
Mathias W. Reimann, the Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law, received his basic legal education
in Germany (Referendar, 1978; Assessor, 1981). He is a graduate of and holds a doctorate (Dr.
iur. Utr., 1982) from the University of Freiburg Law School, where he taught for several years.
He is also a graduate of the University of Michigan Law School (LLM, 1983). He publishes
widely both in the United States and abroad in the areas of comparative law, private international
law, and legal history. He has held visiting appointments in many countries around the world,
including France, Italy, Japan, Israel, Germany, and Austria.

Margo Schlanger
Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law
Margo Schlanger, the Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, is a leading authority on civil rights
issues and civil and criminal detention. She joined the Law School faculty in fall 2009; her
teaching and research deal with civil rights, prison reform, torts, and surveillance. She also
founded and heads the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse. She is the court-appointed
settlement monitor for Adams v. Kentucky Department of Corrections, a statewide civil rights
lawsuit dealing with conditions of confinement for Kentucky's deaf prisoners. Before starting at
Michigan, she was a professor at Washington University in St. Louis and an assistant professor
at Harvard Law School.
In 2010 and 2011, Professor Schlanger was on leave, serving as the presidentially appointed
Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
As the head of civil rights and civil liberties for DHS, she was the secretary's lead adviser on
civil rights and civil liberties issues. In that capacity, she testified before Congress; chaired the
Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Subcommittee of the federal Information Sharing
Environment's Information Sharing and Access Interagency Policy Committee; chaired the
Interagency Coordinating Council on Emergency Preparedness and Individuals with Disabilities;
served on the first U.S. delegation to the UN Universal Periodic Review; and met with
community leaders and groups across America to ensure that their perspectives regarding civil
rights and homeland security were considered in the Department's policy process.
Professor Schlanger earned her JD from Yale in 1993. While there, she served as book reviews
editor of the Yale Law Journal and received the Vinson Prize for excellence in clinical casework.
She then served as a law clerk for Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the U.S. Supreme Court from
1993 to 1995. From 1995 to 1998, she was a trial attorney in the U.S. Department of Justice Civil
Rights Division, where she worked to remedy civil rights abuses by prison and police
departments and earned two Division Special Achievement awards.
Professor Schlanger served on the Vera Institute's blue-ribbon Commission on Safety and Abuse
in America's Prisons, worked as an adviser on the development of proposed national standards
implementing the Prison Rape Elimination Act, and testified before the Prison Rape Elimination
Commission. She served as the reporter for the American Bar Association's revision of its
Standards Governing the Legal Treatment of Prisoners. She has been the chair of the Association
of American Law Schools sections on Remedies and on Law and the Social Sciences.
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PANEL I
Between the Public and the Private

Faculty Discussant: Professor Daniel Crane (UM Law School)
Moderator: Nir Fishbien (SJD Candidate, UM Law School)
• William J. Moon (NYU): “Private Ordering of Public Law”
• Deepa Das Acevedo (The University of Pennsylvania Law School): “We
the Working People”
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Will Moon
Will Moon is an Acting Assistant Professor of Lawyering at NYU School of Law. Prior
to joining NYU in 2016, Will worked as a litigation associate at Boies, Schiller & Flexner,
LLP in New York City, where he specialized in cross-border commercial disputes. From
2013-14, Will served as a law clerk to Judge Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr. of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Will holds a J.D. from the Yale Law School, where he
served as a Senior Editor of the Yale Law Journal and a Coker Fellow in Constitutional Law.
At Yale, Will directed the Yale Law Journal’s Legal Scholarship Workshop Reading Group
and was awarded the Ambrose Gherini Prize for Best Paper in International Law. He received
a B.B.A. from the Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan, where
he was the founding Editor-in-Chief of the Michigan Journal of Business.
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Private Ordering of Public Law
Party autonomy is a doctrine in private international law emphasizing the inherent freedom of
contracting parties to select the terms of their agreement, including the law governing their
engagements. Reflecting the doctrine’s intellectual ascendance over the past fifty years, a
significant number of cross-border commercial transactions today operate pursuant to contracts
specifying a particular national or state law as the exclusive source of law governing the parties.
This Article excavates the subtle but important ways that private entities accrete influence over
domestic regulatory law through a growing number of private commercial agreements mandating
the application of “foreign law” with little or no connection to the parties. To date, this
phenomenon has been widely celebrated as promoting efficiency and jurisdictional competition,
but relatively unexamined from a broader regulatory structure or a political legitimacy
standpoint. While a growing body of academic literature is exposing the erosion of substantive
rights that can be expected in the context of unequal bargaining power between contracting
parties, mainstream academics today largely embrace the private entities’ ability to bargain for
the law governing commercial transactions, so long as the choice was not a byproduct of fraud or
lopsided bargaining power.
A closer examination, however, reveals a more complicated picture. When disputes arise out of
commercial agreements that implicate domestic regulatory statutes (as they often do), the
interests of non-contracting parties are at stake — namely, the general public that stands to
benefit when private litigants activate statutes that serve the society in general. This is because
public regulatory law is designed not only to provide private remedy, but also intended to help
effectuate particular legislative goals. For instance, by over-compensating injured plaintiffs,
treble damages provided under the RICO Act and the Sherman Act are designed to discourage
non-litigants from violating antitrust and anti-racketeering laws. Unlike traditional private law
remedies, which is generally understood as the state’s minimum effort to ensure that private
agreements are respected, treble damages are in place for penal and deterrence purposes. When
coupled with the standing doctrine, which keeps out plaintiffs from seeking remedy in courts
when the injury is too remote from statutory violations, private commercial agreements may
erode domestic regulatory law by systematically precluding potential litigants from activating
otherwise applicable domestic statutes. This is particularly unsettling because both Congress and
state legislatures rely heavily (to a unique degree) on private litigants to effectuate statutory
goals. At minimum, this theoretical defect displays a serious need to re-think how we have
understood the rise of private contractual ordering.
To be sure, there is nothing inherently pernicious about borderless private bargaining. Private
entities typically specify the law governing contracts in order to enhance predictability as to what
law would apply to the wide array of legal claims that can arise in complex commercial
transactions. The system of private governance mechanisms that transcend territoriallyconfigured rules, however, does not take place agnostic to the structure of existing regulatory
law. To that end, this Article begins a normative discussion centered on remedying the
legitimacy deficit associated with private agreements that can systematically undermine the
enforcement of public law.
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Deepa Das Acevedo
Deepa Das Acevedo is a Sharswood Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
She previously received her JD and her PhD in Anthropology, both from the University of
Chicago. Her work uses qualitative social science methods like ethnographic fieldwork to
study how legal rules and concepts operate on the ground and to explore the relationships
between individuals and society as well as between citizens and the state. This interest in law,
personhood, and liberal democratic politics drives both her research on employment and the
sharing economy in the United States and her work on religion and constitutional law in
India. Her publications have appeared or are forthcoming in Boston College International &
Comparative Law Review, University of Chicago Legal Forum, Law & Social Inquiry, the
American Journal of Comparative Law, Modern Asian Studies, Notre Dame Law Review
Online, and Employee Rights & Employment Policy Journal.
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We the Working People
The sharing economy was supposed to bring Americans greater freedom at work, but critics are
increasingly pointing out that platform companies exercise significant and largely unregulated
control over workers. Are these two positions mutually exclusive? This paper uses ethnographic
fieldwork across a range of platforms to argue that they are not. Instead, debates over
employment in the sharing economy—especially over the issue of how to classify platform
workers—reflect an underlying tension in both law and popular perception about what it means
to be free at work. On the one hand, freedom at work relies on a classically “negative”
conception of liberty as simple non-interference or the absence of employer control. The
scheduling flexibility and entrepreneurial aspects of sharing economy labor speak to this view.
On the other hand, freedom at work draws on a conception of liberty that is often called
“republican,” according to which freedom lies in not being vulnerable to the potential,
arbitrarily exercised power of another. The invisible and indirect authority exercised by
platforms over their workers clashes with this view. Not only does the tension between these
conceptions of freedom make it difficult to understand what “control” means in the sharing
economy and thus whether platform workers ought to be employees rather than independent
contractors, it also lies at the heart of long running debates over classification and work
regulation more broadly.
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Panel II
Public Law
Faculty Discussant: Professor Julian Davis Mortenson (UM Law School)
Moderator: Aviram Shahal (SJD Candidate, UM Law School)
• Noah Rosenblum (Columbia University): “Making Presidential
Democracy: Revisiting the Executive Reorganization Act of 1937”
• Sarah Light (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania):
“Advisory Preemption”
• Andrew Keane Woods (University of Kentucky, Visiting professor University of Texas): “The Transperency Tax”
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Noah Rosenblum
Noah Rosenblum is a J.D./Ph.D. candidate, pursuing his law degree at Yale Law School and his
doctorate in legal and intellectual history at Columbia University. His research focuses on the
history of democratic ideas and institutions in the 19th and 20th century. His dissertation, “The
Tribe of the Eagle: Presidential Democracy in Thought and Practice, 1927-1952,” explores the
legal and institutional development of the modern American executive. His academic writing, on
topics in legal history and the history of democratic thought, has appeared in H-Law, The Yale
Law Journal, and at the blog of the Society for U.S. Intellectual History, among other places. His
doctoral studies have been supported by a Javits Fellowship from the U.S. Department of
Education. In 2015, he was a Legal History Fellow at the Yale Law School. In 2017 and 2018, he
will serve judicial clerkships with Judge Jenny Rivera of the New York Court of Appeals and
Judge Guido Calabresi of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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Making Presidential Democracy:
Revisiting the Executive Reorganization Act of 1937
We live in an age of presidential democracy. As even a casual observer can see, the
contemporary United States channels much of its putatively democratic rule through the office of
the national executive. This is surprising. It is not how the Constitution was supposed to work.
It also flies in the face of strong anti-executive traditions in American political thought,
institutional design, and public law. Remarkably, American state builders empowered the
president despite all this, and successfully grounded the expanded executive in argument and
law.
This paper reconstructs and analyzes a key part of that story: the development of the institutional
and intellectual underpinnings of the modern presidency through the Executive Reorganization
Act of 1937. It argues that the Act and its accompanying report sketched the blueprint for the
presidential democracy of today. Although the 1937 bill failed to pass, its vision was largely
realized over the next fifty years anyway. The rise of modern presidential democracy was not
haphazard or accidental. It constituted the culmination of a longstanding, theoretically
sophisticated movement to make mass representative democracy work.
I begin by tracing the emergence of that 1937 vision from earlier efforts at reform. I argue that it
was the product of a New Deal reimagining of an older Progressive tradition centered on
“responsible government.” At the turn of the twentieth century, thinker-reformers like Woodrow
Wilson and Frank Goodnow championed fundamental state reorganization to make elected
officials more accountable to their constituents and create a closer connection between voters
and policy. At the heart of their proposals were plans to empower the executive branch through
administrative centralization, civil service professionalization, and the development of an
executive-led budgeting process. These reforms, they believed, would help overcome the single
greatest obstacle to responsible government: the separation of powers, which frustrated the
state’s ability to achieve its ends while obscuring responsibility for its failures.
The members of the President’s Committee on Administrative Management, which formulated
the 1937 Act, adapted and transformed Wilson and Goodnow’s ideas. Students of Progressive
Era reform and veterans of the movements for state and local government reorganization, they
shared many of their teachers concerns.
Unsurprisingly, they followed their key
recommendations. However, the emergence of fascism in Europe in the 1930s inflected their
thought decisively. It pushed them to distinguish their envisioned American regime from its
European counterparts, even while advocating for not-dissimilar government reforms, such as
greatly strengthening the national executive. This was no easy distinction to make, particularly
since Progressive Era reform thought could be a close cousin of outright proto-fascism. The
President’s Committee’s solution involved embracing the doctrine of separation of powers. So
doing, they rejected their teachers. But this created new possibilities for legitimating their
proposed reforms and harmonizing emergent presidential democracy with American law.
Although my argument is novel, it builds on and revises an existing and growing literature on the
Reorganization Act. In the last decade, scholars of administrative and constitutional law have
begun to appreciate the importance of the 1937 bill and the Report of the President’s Committee.
However, this scholarship has so far remained narrowly focused on technical questions such as
18

the pedigree of “internal administrative law” or the history of the theory of the “unitary
executive.” It has not sought a broader understanding of the Act and its significance, and does
not engage deeply with the prior historiography or make much use of primary sources. The
recent scholarly interest in the Act is best interpreted as a welcome invitation to further research.
My paper takes it up.
The argument advances through an analysis of published and archival sources. It sits at the
intersection of intellectual history, legal history, and American Political Development, and
makes use of methods distinctive to each. Throughout, it pays particular attention to the
transnational dimension of intellectual debate and institutional development that was
characteristic of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Its primary aim is to revisit the
Executive Reorganization Act of 1937 in its original context to uncover the unsettling
foundations of the presidential democracy Americans live with today.
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Sarah Light
Sarah E. Light is an Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Business Ethics at the
Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania, where she teaches
Environmental Management, Law, and Policy. In the spring of 2017, Light is teaching
Environmental Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and she has previously
taught Environmental Management, Law, and Policy at Columbia University.
Professor Light's research examines issues at the intersection of environmental law and
business and technological innovation. Her articles have addressed the regulatory
implications of the rise of transportation platforms like Uber and Lyft; the federalism
implications of the development of new technologies like autonomous vehicles; how
business innovation, such as Microsoft's adoption of a private carbon fee, can be a form of
private environmental governance; and the U.S. military's role in stimulating private
technological innovation to reduce fossil fuel use in what Light has called The MilitaryEnvironmental Complex. Her articles have appeared in and are forthcoming in the Yale Law
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U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and others in affirmative and defensive environmental
litigation. She has also served as a pro bono mediator in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York.
Light earned her J.D. from Yale Law School, an M. Phil in Politics from Oxford
University where she was a Rhodes Scholar, and an A.B. in Social Studies magna cum
laude from Harvard College.

20

Advisory Preemption
We are living in an era of dramatic and unpredictable innovation. Federal agencies have been at
the forefront of updating substantive legal rules to meet new challenges not originally
contemplated by Congress. Yet some of these innovations – for example, the emergence of new
technologies like autonomous vehicles, smart homes, and drones, or business innovations like
the rise of the sharing economy – upset longstanding legislative equilibria not only for
substantive legal rules, but also for federalism. For example, for the past fifty years, the federal
statute regulating motor vehicle safety in the United States has delegated authority to the federal
government to regulate the safety of the “vehicle,” but left it up to the states to regulate “driver”
behavior through insurance, licensing, and tort rules. The rise of autonomous vehicles erodes the
bright line between vehicles and drivers, as vehicle hardware and software can now operate
functions once exclusively in the control of humans behind the wheel.
Innovation gives rise to innovation uncertainty – the many unknowns that arise temporarily as a
result of technological or business innovation, including what the most significant risks and
benefits of the activity are, how those risks and benefits will be distributed, what path the
innovation may take in its development, and the timing of that development, among others. Will
“local” or “national” concerns predominate? This innovation uncertainty raises important
questions both about which level of government should decide how to govern now in the current
state of uncertainty, and who should decide in the future. Significant uncertainty about the
unpredictable path that innovation may take requires flexibility to shift beyond an initial or
longstanding allocation of regulatory authority among the federal, state, and local governments.
This Article identifies a new method that federal agencies can use to achieve this time-limited
flexibility, what I call a suggestion of preemption, and defends its use as a normative matter,
using autonomous vehicle technology safety regulation as a case study. Ordinary preemption, by
Congress, courts, or agencies, can shift the balance of power from the states to the federal
government. In contrast, a suggestion of preemption has the opposite effect. In a suggestion of
preemption, an agency recommends in published policy guidance, but does not mandate, that
states limit their legislative and rulemaking actions, and sets a timetable for revisiting the
allocation of authority. Suggestions of preemption thus serve multiple salutary purposes. First,
they clarify the agency’s current view of its regulatory authority both for the states and for
regulated industry. Second, they offer flexibility in the allocation of regulatory authority if
innovation takes an unpredictable path. And they are “suggestions” rather than “threats,” because
while the federal agency believes it may hold a supremacy trump card, the circumstances are
sufficiently uncertain that technological development may undermine that trump card, or the
agency may choose not to use it at all. Thus, a suggestion of preemption can open a dialogue
with states and industry; it does not shut the door. Although suggestions of preemption impose
costs in regulatory uncertainty, they promote normative values such as innovation and precaution
about the risks of innovation. And while they lack the procedural protections of notice-andcomment rulemaking that are designed to promote democratic legitimacy, suggestions of
preemption, by not freezing for all time the policy preferences of past regulators, promote a
different kind of democratic legitimacy – legitimacy in time. Most significantly, suggestions of
preemption can temporarily insert de facto dynamic, overlapping jurisdiction under conditions of
innovation uncertainty, even into a dual federalism scheme.
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The Transparency Tax
Transparency is critical to good governance, but it also imposes significant governance
costs. Beyond a certain point, excess transparency acts as a kind of tax on the legal
system. Others have noted the burdens of maximalist transparency policies on both
budgets and regulatory efficiency, but they have largely ignored the deeper cost that
transparency imposes: it constrains one’s ability to support the law while telling a selfserving story about what that support means. Transparency’s true tax on the law is the
loss of expressive ambiguity.
In order to understand this tax, this Article develops a taxonomy of transparency types.
Typically, transparency means something like openness. But openness about what—the
law’s obligations? The reasons for the obligations? The actors behind the law? And open
to whom? These are different aspects of what we typically lump together and call
“transparency,” and they present different tradeoffs. With these tradeoffs in mind, we can
begin to make more informed choices about how to draw the line between maximal and
minimal transparency. Of particular note is the finding that we can demand maximal
transparency about the law’s obligations without incurring much of the transparency tax.
This runs contrary to the soft law literature, which suggests that vagueness about
obligation is less costly than the alternative. The Article concludes with a guide for
thinking through future transparency tradeoffs.
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Federalism and Foreign Relations in the United States and the European
Union: Hierarchy versus Pluralism
Over the last twenty five years, a paradox has manifested itself at the heart of the European
integration project. On the one hand, the EU has been charged with ever greater responsibilities.
From a narrowly defined project of market integration, the framers of the EU Treaties have
transformed the EU into a polity active in a broad range of policy-making areas, including
environmental protection, energy policy, police and judicial cooperation in criminal and private
law matters, and so forth. On the other hand, Member States have become increasingly reluctant
to share let alone surrender powers to the EU level of governance. The result, political scientists
have argued, has been the emergence of a ‘New Intergovernmentalism’, i.e. a modus of
integration in which the scope of the European integration project has expanded in parallel with
an increasing grip of Member States on EU decision-making processes (see e.g. Bickerton e.a.
2015).
This paper explores this paradox in one particular area of EU policy- and law-making action: the
area of foreign relations or ‘external action.’ The paper aims to foster a better understanding of
the constitutional relationship between the EU level of governance and the Member States in the
undertaking of action on the international scene. In particular, it tackles the question of how the
EU Treaties, which in a functional sense can be understood as the constitutional charter of a
compound EU polity, strive to reconcile unity and diversity in the sphere of EU foreign relations.
Further operationalising this objective, the paper examines, firstly, how ‘foreign affairs powers’
are divided between the EU and its Member States and, secondly, how conflicts between the EU
and its Member States in the undertaking of international action are prevented or resolved.
The paper adopts a comparative methodology. By comparing and contrasting the balance
between unity and diversity in the sphere of foreign relations in Europe and the United States,
the paper firstly examines the constitutional landscape in the EU from an external vantage point,
thereby creating a potential for critical assessment. Secondly, the paper explores whether lessons
can be drawn from the experience of the United States in this area. The paper advances a twofold argument. First, in historical terms, it argues that in both polities the relationship between
the centre and the member units has undergone a transformation from a paradigm of exclusively
federal or EU powers to a paradigm in which powers are shared in principle. Second, in
normative terms, and drawing on the US experience, the paper argues that much is to be gained
from understanding shared EU powers as concurrent powers. Under this understanding, the
existence of constraints ought to be recognised on the exercise of shared powers by the Member
States, in particular when the EU itself has undertaken international action. It follows that
‘mixed’ or joint EU-Member State action should be considered the exception rather than the
general rule.
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The Cultural Implications of Market Regulation: Does the EU Destroy the Texture of
National Life?
A persistent set of arguments, both in the academic and the general debate, denounces EU integration not
only because of its adverse economic, social or political consequences, but also because of its cultural
ones. As markets grow more homogenous and limitless, everyday life looses its national character and
citizens are left with a weakened sense of community and identity. In legal scholarship, this argument
takes the shape of a denunciation of the free movement decisions of the Court of Justice of the EU and the
Commission’s competition interventions as they are said to destroy forms of market regulation that have
been part of the national fabric for decades and have taken on a certain cultural significance. As a
consequence, the argument goes, Europe grows not only more homogeneous but also more illegitimate.
Through three case studies (book pricing rules; forms of entry regulation affecting retail distribution;
certain regulated professions) and by employing socio-legal methodologies, my dissertation tries to
challenge this narrative, which I label the culturalist narrative, by providing a more nuanced account of
the relationship between market regulation and culture and a thinner grained description of the impact of
EU interventions in certain markets. My empirical claim is that EU law is sufficiently permissive to allow
member states to retain and even upgrade their preferred market arrangements: it encourages reflection
over the real motivations of national market regulation, sometimes forces amendments, but its impact is
rarely purely deregulatory or homogenizing.
In this article – which serves as the first chapter and theoretical framework of my dissertation, I draw from
material collected for my case studies as well as contributions coming from various disciplines, to better
describe the implications of these forms of market regulation. The question I try to answer is: what are the
real concerns that the culturalist narrative tries to voice? Or, in other words, what do member states really
protect through these rules that the EU supposedly destroys? The rules at stake are about “how to buy and
sell things” – they regulate who can sell what, where, at what prices and in which places. Beyond their
immediate functional import, these rules affect the shape of markets and protect a distinctive dimension of
the retail experience. Through them, the State articulates that distinctive experience as an element of local
culture, which is offered protection as a democratic response to the demands of citizens. The structure of
the chapter is as follows. In the first section, I introduce the culturalist narrative and point at its main
ambiguities. In the second section, I explore theoretical possibilities on how the law in general and market
regulation in particular interact with variously defined notions of culture. In the third section, I define the
rules I am studying, I justify why I choose them and try to offer a preliminary conceptualization by
isolating the various interests at stake and linking them to the previous discussion. In particular I try to
develop conceptual categories about the interests involved that will guide me in the case studies
(Producerist Law; Smallness; the Comforts of Home; Consumer Identities; Moral Limits of the Market;
etc.). Finally I sketch some conclusions by anticipating few findings from the further chapters.
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Access to Justice in the United Nations Human Rights Committee
Individual access to international institutions is seen as one of the most important developments
in international human rights law since World War II. Granting individuals the ability to access
international institutions to file complaints against their countries was considered to be especially
innovative since it took human rights from the domestic jurisdiction to the international level.
Moreover, it recognized individual people, and not only countries, as the possessing certain
rights under international law, thus breaking the classical model of international law as solely
regulating relations between states.
Even though with time there seems to be an increase in the number of international institutions
granting individuals rights to access them, there is a gap in the empirical literature regarding the
actual usage of this right. For instance, much more empirical research is needed regarding the
questions - who are the main beneficiaries of this right in practice, what are the main difficulties
individuals face with accessing international justice, and what can be done in order to make
international institutions more accessible to people from all over the world.
This paper uses the individual petitions system under the First Optional Protocol (“OP”) to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) as a case study in order to shed
some light on the actual practice of the right to access international justice. The United Nations
Human Rights Committee (“HRC”), the treaty body responsible for overseeing the
implementation of the ICCPR, is of special interest to researchers since it is a quasi-judicial
tribunal that can receive individual communications against 115 states. Although over a billion
people have been under the jurisdiction of the HRC since 1977, as of March 2014, only 2,371
individual communications had been brought by petitioners. This single piece of data can in
itself pose a grave doubt on the success of the idea of access to international justice in the context
of the HRC, or at least trigger further research into this question.
The current paper has two main purposes. The first purpose is to describe and evaluate
empirically the right of individuals to access the HRC under the OP, in light of the special goals
of this procedure as perceived by the different stakeholders. The second purpose is to make
recommendations on ways to improve the access of individuals to the HRC, and to international
justice in general. In order to address the first question, the paper uses an empirical mixed
methods approach. For the quantitative part of the research, I have constructed an original dataset
of the number of the communications brought against different countries in a given year.
Additionally, I coded the various political and socio-economic characteristics of those countries.
This gives us a picture of who most often uses the individual communications mechanism, and
what might be the main obstacles with filing communications to the HRC. Second, I conducted
interviews with 32 applicants, lawyers and NGOs that brought (or helped to bring)
communications to the HRC. The interviewees were asked questions about their experiences
with the process, their difficulties with it, and how they thought that the process could be made
more accessible. The combination of the two methods can help us to evaluate the success of the
process. In order to address the second purpose and make recommendations about the
accessibility of the HRC, I rely both on the empirical findings, and on general literature about
access to justice.
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The paper finds that there is a significant global inequality in accessing the HRC, since
communications are much more likely to be filed against democratic countries with high socioeconomic characteristics. Also, there seems to be a problem with the awareness to the possibility
of filing individual communications. Another problem with the accessibility of the system is
state intimidation of applicants who filed communications to the HRC, and also many procedural
problems that stem from the fact that the UN Secretariat (and the HRC itself) is very much
under-funded. However, the system is widely perceived as fair, and most of the applicants would
recommend others to file communications to the HRC.

31

Panel IV
Law and Society
Faculty Discussant: Professor Sherman Clark (UM Law School)
Moderator: Tami Groswald Ozery (SJD Candidate, UM Law School)
• Andrea Freeman (University of Hawai'i, UC Berkeley - visiting
professor): "Unmothering Black Women: Formula Feeding and the Legacy
of Slavery”
• Doron Dorfman (Stanford): “The Fear of 'Disability Con': Backlash and
Mistrust in the Shadow of the Law”
• Karin Carmit Yefet (University of Haifa): “Divorce as a Gender Equality
Right”

32

Andrea Freeman
Andrea Freeman is an Assistant Professor at the University of Hawaii William S. Richardson
School of Law and is currently visiting at UC Berkeley School of Law. She teaches
Constitutional Law, Federal Courts, and Race and Law. She writes in the areas of critical race
and class theory, health, economics, and food policy, with a focus on her theory of food
oppression. Her article, A Rehabilitative Reparations Approach to Racism Against Credit Card
Consumers, was selected for presentation at the 2016 Yale/Harvard/Stanford Junior Faculty
Forum. She is a member of the ACLU of Hawaii Litigation Committee, and received the
Community Faculty of the Year award in 2015.

33

Unmothering Black Women: Formula Feeding and the Legacy of Slavery
On May 23, 1946, in the rural southern town of Reidsville, North Carolina, a small miracle
occurred. The woman responsible for this miracle was Annie Mae Fultz: a tall, beautiful BlackCherokee woman who was the deaf and mute mother of six children. Beginning at 1:13am,
Annie Mae gave birth, at three-minute intervals, to the world’s first recorded identical
quadruplets. Against the odds, each of these four strong, tiny girls survived their first few hours
and began to grow steadily. Annie Mae’s joy at her perfect new daughters was irrepressible,
expressed in exuberant debates with friends and relatives at her hospital bedside about possible
names for the girls. But Annie Mae’s happiness was short-lived.
Fred Klenner, the White doctor who delivered the quads, began testing his controversial theories
about Vitamin C on the girls from their birth. Klenner also named the girls himself, after his
wife, sister, aunt, and great-aunt. Finally, Klenner negotiated with formula companies seeking to
break into the untapped market of Black mothers by becoming the newly famous Fultz Quads’
corporate godfather. St. Louis’ Pet Milk Company won the honor. The deal Klenner made set in
motion a series of events that would lead Annie Mae to lose, not just the right to name her girls,
but her beloved girls themselves.
Catalyzed by Pet Milk’s groundbreaking advertising campaign, formula marketing to Black
women increased over the next few decades. Simultaneously, popular images of Black women
breastfeeding decreased, both reflecting and encouraging the actual decline in the number of
Black children who were breastfed. By 2008, only 59% of Black women ever tried
breastfeeding, compared to 80% of Latina mothers and 75% of White mothers, with only 12% of
Black mothers still breastfeeding at 6 months, compared to 26.3% of Latina mothers and 24.3%
of White mothers. These disparities in breastfeeding rates correspond with a number of other
racial health disparities among women and children, the most significant of which is infant
mortality, which strikes three times as many Black babies as White babies.
Racial disparities in breastfeeding represent first food injustice, which is a form of food
oppression. Food oppression is facially neutral food-related law, policy, or government practice
that creates health disparities along race, gender, and class lines. Cultural myths about personal
responsibility that ignore structural determinants of food choice, as well as racial stereotypes,
make these disparities appear natural. Therefore, to reverse the effects of food oppression,
attempts to reform law and policy must be accompanied by efforts to change societal
perspectives on food and racial justice.
Building on my previous paper exploring the laws and policies that create and perpetuate first
food injustice, this Article interrogates the problem of racial disparities in breastfeeding by
looking at the history of infant feeding from a race and class perspective and engaging in an indepth analysis of how marketing and racial stereotyping affect societal and cultural perceptions
of who should be breastfeeding. The Article argues that formula marketing, popular culture, and
racial stereotypes work together to discourage Black women from breastfeeding and create a
climate of indifference to the laws and policies that support the formula industry and cause
disproportionate racial harm.
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The story of the Fultz Quads punctuates the Article, illustrating how the racial project of selling
formula to Black women relies on the exploitation of Black women and girls, while bringing to
light the extraordinary lives of these exceptional women. In its final part, the Article examines
the extent and potential of constitutional protections of breastfeeding, and surveys international
laws designed to address similar problems. The Article concludes by offering a blueprint for both
social and legal reforms that could, in conjunction, reduce racial disparities in breastfeeding and
their concomitant harms.
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The Fear of “Disability Con”: Backlash and Mistrust in the Shadow of the
Law
According to the U.S. Census Bureau one in every five Americans has some kind of disability,
making this group the largest minority in America. People with disabilities enjoy a robust body
of legislation aimed at illustrating and protecting their rights, including the omnibus Americans
with Disabilities Act, which adopted a “cross disability approach” and covers people with
mental, physical, sensory and developmental disabilities (just to name a few). Nevertheless,
disability studies scholars argue that there is something that occludes disabled individuals from
participating fully in the labor market, education and society. This project helps to delineate and
explain the invisible barriers confronted by Americans with disabilities when trying to obtain
their accommodations and rights. These invisible barriers have to do with the public suspicion of
malingering and abusing disability law.
I argue that this perceived abuse caused a “popular backlash” against disability rights, which
mirrors in a lot of ways what was termed the “Supreme Court backlash” and the Court’s
“hostility towards disability-related suits,” yet has not been fully addressed in the literature. This
backlash manifests in suspicion and negative attitudes towards people with disabilities among
courts, the media and consequently in public perceptions and interactions between disabled and
non-disabled members of society.
This project examines everyday interactions with disability in places laypeople pass by almost
daily: parking lots, office buildings, airport terminals, corridors of schools and universities and
many more. It highlights tacit judgments about the authenticity of people claiming disabilities by
passers by. Laypeople have unstated assumptions regarding the “true nature” of others’
disabilities and the perceived motives and legality behind their actions in utilizing disability law.
These situations fall under what I call the “public perception of disability con,” i.e., the fear of
people taking advantage of accommodations and disability-related rights by faking disabilities.
This suspicion discourages people with disabilities from claiming and maintaining their legal
rights. Thus it prevents their equal participation in social life.
Instances when non-disabled people pretend to have disabilities may occur in myriad everyday
life situations. People may pretend to be disabled in order to get some kind of benefit or “perk”
such as getting a favorable parking spot, having privileges with regard to their pets (which they
present as service animals), getting on board flights faster, earning extra time on exams in
educational settings, skipping lines at theme parks or at governmental offices, or claiming
governmental assistance in the form of Social Security disability benefits. Similar concerns can
also happen when persons with disabilities exaggerate their conditions in order to get benefits.
This is the first study that seeks to empirically assess the phenomenon of the public suspicion of
disability con. It attempts to answer the following questions: (1) How widespread is the
phenomenon of public perception of disability con among the American public and how does it
manifest? (2) What everyday life situations and circumstances produce more suspicion? (3) How
does the suspicion of disability con affect people with disabilities? (4) Does it prevent them from
maintaining their legal rights?
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I am using a mixed methods approach – collecting data via a survey of a representative sample of
the U.S. population to answer the first two research questions, alongside one-on-one interviews
conducted with people with disabilities, to answer the last two questions. The survey (conducted
with a sample of 1,085 respondents) aims to reach the general public (disabled and non-disabled
people) and assess their perceptions about the misuse of disability rights and their reactions to
situations that are prone to the disability con. The interviews were conducted with a different
research population, 43 disabled people who live independently in the SF Bay Area, in order to
explore how the fear of disability con affects their lives and psychological strategies of claiming
and negotiating rights. Ultimately, I offer policy recommendations to improve the lives of
disabled Americans.
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Divorce as a Gender Equality Right
The laws of marriage have long served as among the chief vehicles for cultivating women’s
social and economic dependency on men and inflicting status-harm on women as a class. The
laws of divorce, especially the fault regime that has dominated marital dissolution laws for much
of American history, have likewise functioned to maintain gender hierarchy and reify sex-role
stereotypes. Even today, the egalitarian marriage is still more a myth than reality. American
women in the twenty-first century routinely encounter – and struggle against – structural
inequities in their marriages, which permeate all gender relations and impede women’s full
citizenship stature.
Because of the role marriage has played in fostering both private and public patriarchy, feminists
have insisted that equality in education, politics, and the workplace cannot not be fully realized
without corresponding changes in the gender hierarchy of the marital family. Accordingly, many
liberal feminists have advocated egalitarian marriage, which would "encourage and facilitate the
equal sharing by men and women of paid and unpaid work, of productive and reproductive
labor," as a crucial step towards rectifying women's continuing subordination and economic
vulnerability. More radical feminist family theorists, led by Martha Fineman, have gone so far as
to call for the abolition of marriage altogether.
Neither solution, however, is adequate. The first – egalitarian marriage – is a practical
impossibility for the foreseeable future: it would require abolition of gender hierarchy where it is
most entrenched. The second - abolition of marriage – is misguided: it would deprive
individuals and society of the recognized benefits of marriage without guaranteeing women legal
protection against subordination in intimate relationships.
Instead, I develop a modest, yet essential, legal innovative construct – a constitutional right to
unilateral, no-fault divorce. The substance of this right is not purely negative. I capture its
affirmative dimension with the appellation “marital freedom.” The right to marital freedom is
imperative to combat marital subordination, one that is derived from multiple interpretations of
America’s constitutional commitment to gender equality. I develop the sex equality argument for
the right to divorce in three Parts.
Part I presents the constitutional edifice of gender equality. It begins with the Court’s
conceptualization of the Equal Protection Clause in formal terms, using the “antidiscrimination”
principle, and then considers several competing, substantive visions of constitutional equality,
most prominent among these theories is the “antisubordination” principle.
Parts II and III examine how the substantive and formal approaches to gender equality apply to
the right to divorce. Part II employs the substantive theories of gender equality to the divorce
context. It analyzes how laws that effectively compel wifehood by limiting exit injure women,
showing that state action is implicated even when a husband’s subordination of his wife appears
to be “private.” First, it opens with a historical account, examining how the common law of
marital status fostered the unequal position of women in marriage, how divorce restrictions
served to lock women in patriarchal relationships, and how leading feminists of the era
recognized the right to divorce as a substantive gender equality imperative. Second, it documents
the inequalities that plague modern marriages and continue to compromise women’s full
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citizenship, considering sociological evidence on the division of household labor, women’s
lesser economic power and decision-making authority, and their heightened physical
vulnerability. Third, it analyzes women’s divorce accounts to establish that most women who
seek marital freedom do so to escape inegalitarian relationships they find demeaning and to
expose divorce as an experience that enhances women’s independence and capacities for
personal self-government. I conclude that the right to divorce is an important antisubordination
remedy that substantially enhances women's control over their own lives, and over their status,
more generally, as equal citizens.
Finally, Part III constructs a constitutional argument for marital freedom under the Supreme
Court’s formal, antidiscrimination-oriented jurisprudence of the Equal Protection Clause. First, I
show that divorce-restrictive regulations historically were animated by discriminatory purposes
and that fault grounds to this day are judicially applied in ways that raise equal protection
concerns. Second, I show that the contemporary movement to restrict divorce repeats history: its
impetus is to shore up the traditional family structure based on constitutionally-proscribed views
that subordinate women to the roles of wives and mothers.
This makes the access to unilateral no-fault divorce a fundamental right for women attempting to
navigate in the world as equals and an imperative for a constitutional system committed to
disestablishing gender hierarchy.
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Panel V
Empirical Legal Research
Faculty Discussant: Professor J J Prescott (UM Law School)
Moderator: Orli Oren-Kolbinger (Grotius Research Scholar, UM Law School)
• Monika Leszczyńska (NYU): “Think Twice Before you Sign! An
Experiment on the Cautionary Function of Contractual Formalities”
• Emily Satterthwaite (University of Toronto): “Entrepreneurs’ Legal
Status Choices and the C Corporation Survival Penalty”
• Greg Buchak (University of Chicago): “Does Competition Reduce Racial
Discrimination in Lending?”
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Monika Leszczyńska
Monika Leszczyńska is a Post-Doctoral Global Fellow at the New York University School of
Law and a Visiting Researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in
Bonn (Germany). She received a master’s degree in law from the Adam Mickiewicz University
in Poznan (Poland) and an LLM degree in international and European business law from the
Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich (Germany). She earned her PhD degree in law
(summa cum laude) from the University in Bonn for a doctoral thesis entitled “Behavioral effects
of corporate governance reforms and their legal implications”. During her doctoral studies, she
was a member of the International Max Planck Research School “Uncertainty” and a Research
Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. There she learned to
design, program and conduct economic experiments as well as analyzed experimental data to
answer legally motivated questions.
Monika combines her legal education and professional experience with experimental economics
approach to provide evidence-based arguments to the ongoing legal debates. For instance, in her
research on affirmative action and group dynamics she described behavioral consequences of a
gender quota rule for cooperation between group members. She also investigated experimentally
the impact of two types of contracts – fixed-term and open-ended – on individual behavior
showing that seemingly equivalent contract types might differently influence a contractual
relationship. In a most recent research project, Monika has examined the impact of contractual
formalities, such as a handwritten signature, on impulsive behavior. Monika aspires to
communicate her projects to the legal and experimental community. One example of this
approach is her study on gender quotas, which have yielded one article for an experimental
journal (published in the Journal of Economic Psychology), and another for a primarily legal
audience (revised and resubmitted to the European Business Organization Law Review).
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Think Twice Before You Sign! An Experiment on the Cautionary
Function of Contractual Formalities
Every day, we provide our consent to a large number of online agreements. The widespread use
of the internet not only made already existing services and goods more accessible but also
created many new ones. This digital contractual environment poses challenges to both consumers
and legal scholars. For instance, it is easier for companies offering their products and services
online to distract consumers or to exploit their impatience (Tasker and Pakcyk 2008). These
properties of online contracting raise many legal dilemmas. One very important concern is to
which extent, if at all, digital contract formation fulfills the cautionary function of acting “as a
check against inconsiderate action” (Fuller 1941, p. 800). This purpose has been traditionally
believed to be served by contractual formalities (e.g., having a contract in writing with a
handwritten signature). The issue of the cautionary function is of a great importance to legal
scholars for at least three reasons. First, if consumers deliberate so little and are prone to make
hasty decisions when entering into online agreements, should that be taken into consideration by
courts when evaluating abusive contractual practices? Second, it is unclear whether a contractual
formality in the form of a paper contract actually does fulfill its cautionary function. Since
certain contract types are still required to be signed on paper in some legal systems (e.g.,
consumer credit contracts in Germany), it is important to investigate whether the additional costs
of a paper form are justified by its effectiveness in preventing impulsive decisions. Finally, if a
handwritten signature indeed leads people to consider their actions more carefully than when
clicking on the “I agree” button, could we then design the online form in a manner that would
make it equivalent to the paper form in terms of its cautionary function?
Scholars have claimed that a mouse click does not create a similar “psychological barrier”
(Einsele 2015) or signal the same importance of a decision as a handwritten signature (Hillman
and Rachlinski 2002, Moringiello 2005). This assumption although fundamental has never been
tested before. To resolve some of the legal dilemmas related to the cautionary function of online
and paper contracting, I conducted experimental research to test whether signing on a dotted line
leads people to make less impulsive contractual decisions compared to confirming with a mouse
click. In a controlled laboratory experiment, I compared four forms of concluding a contract –
clicking “OK”, typing in one’s name, entering a PIN code (which should reflect a qualified esignature) and handwritten signing. I examined how these different forms of confirming a
decision influence intertemporal choices. More specifically, I investigated whether handwritten
signing indeed leads participants to choose more patiently. I found that individuals are more
impulsive when making their decision by clicking on “OK” or by typing in one’s name than
when confirming their decision by a handwritten signature. No differences were observed
between traditional written form and the one with a PIN code. Further investigation of
underlying mechanisms of this observation might provide a basis for designing equivalent online
forms of concluding a contract which would fulfill the cautionary function as effective as a
written form but would be yet simpler than a qualified e-signature.
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Emily Satterthwaite
Emily Satterthwaite is an Assistant Professor at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law. She
focuses on tax law, and uses experimental, qualitative and quantitative empirical methods to
study how the design of elective provisions in tax statutes and tax agency enforcement policies
plays out “on the ground,” with a particular focus on entry-level entrepreneurs and self-employed
individuals. Her research has been published or is forthcoming in the Florida Tax Review,
McGill Law Journal, Pittsburgh Tax Review, Public Finance Review, and Queen’s Law Journal.
Emily received a B.A. from Yale College, a J.D. from Stanford Law School, a LL.M. from the
University of Toronto Faculty of Law, and a M.A. (Economics) from the University of Toronto.
Prior to joining the Faculty of Law in 2014, she served as the Assistant Director of the Institute
for Justice Clinic on Entrepreneurship at the University of Chicago Law School, where she
supervised upper-year law students in their representation of low-income entrepreneurs. Emily
also worked for three years as a tax associate at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP in
the New York and Chicago offices.
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Entrepreneurs' Legal Status Choices and the C Corporation Survival Penalty
Over 800,000 enterprises are born in the United States each year, creating approximately four
million new jobs. The ability to easily and rapidly start a new business is a foundation of the
American Dream. However, a crucial step in forming an enterprise appears to have become
more complicated in recent years: the process of choosing a legal status. In the aftermath of the
limited liability company (“LLC”) revolution of the late 1980s, a variety of exotic new business
entity statutes were adopted by state legislatures. The choice became even more nuanced when
the federal tax classification of the LLC became unrestrictedly elective. For entry-level
entrepreneurs, the complexity of the legal status choice is frequently cited as a source of
confusion and frustration.
The paper begins by identifying a fundamental tension between two stories about choice-oflegal-status in the theoretical business organizations literature. On the one hand, Larry Ribstein
and others have offered an “efficient contracting” story: a robust range of legal statuses can be
welfare-enhancing for smaller and larger businesses alike. In particular, more legal statuses
means that entrepreneurs with limited resources can customize their business relationships at
lower cost. This permits them to select away from entities that fit poorly with their business
objectives. The efficient contracting story predicts that, on average, legal status should not affect
firm survival outcomes when entrepreneurs are choosing rationally among competing legal
statuses.
On the other hand is a “regressive complexity” story. Scholars critical of “entity proliferation”
are skeptical that the benefits of contractual customization can outweigh the aggregate costs of
legal complexity. They express concern that entrepreneurs at the bottom of the sophistication
and resource spectrum will be disproportionately harmed. The harm may come in the form of
confusion and stress, but also through costly mismatches between an entrepreneur’s objectives
and her chosen legal status for her business. Contrary to the efficient contracting story, the
regressive complexity story predicts that legal status may affect firm survival outcomes for a
particular cohort of entrepreneurs: the under-resourced.
What is at stake in assessing these two competing stories about expanded choice of business
legal status? This paper answers that question by focusing on an overlooked issue in the context
of new firm formation: distributive justice. As a legacy of having few sources of reliable data,
the empirical literature on entrepreneurs’ choice of legal status is still in its infancy. In
particular, how entrepreneurs with varying measures of financial, social, or informational
resources fare in choosing a legal status for their enterprise is an open question.
To begin to fill this gap, the paper exploits a large and recently-released data set on entrepreneurs
and their firms’ performances over time. The Kauffman Firm Survey (“KFS”) collects legal
status, owner, financing, sector, employment and other firm-specific data from a national panel
of nearly five thousand enterprises that were formed in 2004 and followed through 2011. The
paper uses the KFS to evaluate the predictions of the efficient contracting and regressive
complexity stories, and presents four key results. First, controlling for a range of entrepreneur
and firm characteristics, enterprises organized as C corporations are approximately 11 percent
more likely to fail by their eighth year than enterprises with other legal status classifications.
Second, this C corporation survival penalty is concentrated exclusively on a subset of less46

sophisticated C corporations characterized by the absence of both (a) venture capital investors
and (b) contingent equity compensation (stock option) plans for their employees. Third, being
non-white or foreign-born is significantly associated with an entrepreneur’s choice to form a
less-sophisticated C corporation. Fourth, there is a high degree of correlation (0.93) between
less-sophisticated C corporations and C corporations that met the eligibility criteria for electing
into tax-advantaged S corporation status, suggesting that they may have intended but failed to
file the paperwork to make the election. Taken together, these results cast doubt on the efficient
contracting story about legal status choice and provide evidence that the complexity costs of
organizing a new business can be distributionally regressive. The paper concludes by discussing
possible policy implications, including a proposal to level the playing field for less-sophisticated
entrepreneurs by switching the default tax classification for corporations from subchapter C to
subchapter S.
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Greg Buchak
Greg Buchak is a JD/PhD student, getting his PhD in Financial Economics from the University
of Chicago Economics Department and the Booth School of Business. His research interests
focus on the financial system and how its legal institutions can impact outcomes in the real
economy, particularly in the context of consumer and household finance. Recent projects include
studying whether banking regulations that increased competition led to less mortgage lending
discrimination, and whether regulatory enforcement actions against banks following the financial
crisis led to increased entry of non-bank lenders outside the traditional regulatory apparatus. He
is originally from Philadelphia. As an undergraduate, he studied mathematics and finance at the
University of Pennsylvania, and worked at Goldman Sachs before starting his JD/PhD.
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Does Competition Reduce Racial Discrimination in Lending?
(Joint work with Adam Jorring)
As recently as the mid-1990s, African American mortgage applicants were roughly 40% more
likely to have their applications rejected than comparable white applicants. This gap exists
despite the fact that the Fair Housing Act was passed more than 25 years earlier specifically to
combat race-based lending discrimination. Yet by the early-2000s, this gap shrank by nearly one
half. While there is still much to improve, this rapid change between the mid-1990s and early2000s shows remarkable progress in reducing discrimination. This paper seeks to root out the
reason for this change and explore the extent to which it might be further replicated to reduce
discrimination in mortgage lending and in other markets.
Using data from nearly five million mortgage applications, this paper shows that congressional
action was indeed responsible for the decrease in mortgage lending discrimination, but
interestingly, it was not through the enactment of a new anti-discrimination law. Rather, in 1994,
congress passed the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA). The IBBEA,
implemented by states over the mid-1990s and early-2000s, allowed out of state banks to open
branches across state lines. As banks opened new branches across state lines, local lending
competition increased. Non-economic discrimination is costly, and so in the face of more
competition, lenders will tend to lose market share or alter their behavior to discriminate less.
This paper takes advantage of the staggered implementation of IBBEA to estimate the causative
impact that increased competition---particularly the competition increases coming from the
IBBEA---had in reducing lending discrimination, and to test the channels through which it
occurred. The paper finds that following the relaxation these laws, increases in local lending
competition led to the narrowing of approval differentials between comparable white and African
American borrowers by nearly one half. The reduction was driven partially by incumbent banks
altering their lending policies, and partially by the entry of new banks that discriminated less
than the incumbents. Moreover, the paper shows that discriminating banks faced greater costs
than non-discriminating banks when competition increased: Incumbent banks that were less
likely to lend to African American applicants lost more market share than other incumbents.
While both entry and competitive pressures significant reduced racial discrimination in lending,
the results suggest that neither force completely eliminates it, suggesting room for both marketbased and direct approaches targeting discrimination.
The results here suggest that policy makers looking to combat racial discrimination in markets
should view policies that increase competition as one of many tools at their disposal.
Competition as a discrimination-reduction tool can be especially effective at filling in holes in
direct regulation particularly where discrimination can be difficult to prove in court. A regulator
may lack the statistical power to show conclusively that a small bank making only a few loans
per year is engaged in discrimination even when it is in fact discriminating. The entry of a larger,
well-monitored bank can put competitive pressure on the smaller, poorly monitored bank to
discriminate less or lose market share. This economic punishment for discrimination is immune
to the statistical proof problems that a regulator may face, and as shown in this paper, is indeed a
potent force. This implies that a combination of market-based and direct regulatory interventions
can go a long way to reduce discrimination.
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Generalizing to other markets, regulators considering how to regulate new technologies like
Uber and Airbnb should consider the anti-discriminatory role these competitors can play in their
respective markets.
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Panel VI
Law and Technology
Faculty Discussant: Professor Margo Schlanger (UM Law School)
Moderator: Stavros Makris (Grotius Research Scholar, UM Law School)
• Emily Berman (University of Houston): “When Database Queries are
Fourth Amendment Searches”
• Asaf Lubin (Yale Law School): “'We only Spy on Foreigners': The Myth of
a Universal Right to Privacy and the Practice of Mass Extraterritorial
Surveillance”
• Yoni Har Carmel (Haifa University): “Reshaping Ability Grouping
Through Big Data”
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Emily Berman is in her third year as a tenure-track member of the faculty at the University of
Houston Law Center, where she teaches and writes about Constitutional Law, National Security
Law, and Foreign Affairs Law. Prior to joining the UHLC faculty, she spent two years as a
Visiting Assistant Professor at Brooklyn Law School. Before entering academia, Berman clerked
for the Hon. John M. Walker, Jr. of the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, spent four years as
Counsel in the Liberty & National Security Program at the Brennan Center for Justice, and
completed a one-year Furman Fellowship at New York University School of Law. She received
both her J.D. and her LL.M. in International Law from New York University School of Law, and
her A.B. from Duke University.
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When Database Queries are Fourth Amendment Searches
The Fourth Amendment regulates the government’s investigative activity by imposing limits on
information collection. When that collection qualifies as a “search” or “seizure”—i.e., when it
violates a “reasonable expectation of privacy”—the Fourth Amendment normally requires the
government to secure a warrant from a neutral magistrate, based on probable cause, that
identifies the places to be searched and the things to be seized with particularity. There are two
circumstances, however, in which these restraints do not apply—warrant-requirement exceptions
and what I call “Fourth Amendment exemptions.” In the first set of cases, the government
satisfies Fourth Amendment demands merely by demonstrating that the collection was
“reasonable.” In the second, the collection violates no reasonable expectation of privacy, so the
Fourth Amendment simply does not apply. The combination of warrant-requirement exceptions
and Fourth Amendment exemptions allows the government to collect an enormous volume of
data with no demonstrated connection to crime or specific intelligence needs.
Both courts and commentators have recognized that the scope of the government’s collection
authority raises significant privacy concerns, the conventional response to which has been to
suggest modifications to the Fourth Amendment’s regulation of data collection. Collection,
however, is only part of the problem. There are also ways to use this voluminous quantum of
data that threaten individual privacy. Yet so long as information is collected lawfully, the Fourth
Amendment currently has nothing to say about how it is employed.
This Article argues that Fourth Amendment doctrine must do more than heed commentators’
calls for collection-focused reform; it must also abandon its laissez-faire approach to the use of
information. Reform of collection rules—while important—cannot fully address privacy threats
that emanate directly from the use of information. In particular, collection reform cannot
eliminate what Professor Daniel Solove calls the “aggregation problem:” By aggregating many
bits of information—each of which may come from a different source—the government is able
to extract insights that it could not have gleaned from the isolated bits of information alone. In
effect, the whole equals more than the sum of its parts. Yet because the Fourth Amendment fails
to restrict information use, the government may extract insights from this data free from
constitutional constraints.
To address the aggregation problem, I contend that some uses of data aggregation should be
considered “searches” subject to constitutional limits. Specifically, this Article focuses on one
such tool for extraction: database “queries” about particular U.S. persons. When such queries
are reasonably likely to expose knowledge discoverable only by aggregating multiple pieces of
data, they can represent an intrusion on individual privacy equally as problematic as any home
search or wiretap. They should therefore be recognized as “searches” and regulated accordingly.
This Article will proceed in four parts. Part I will illustrate the breadth and volume of
information that the government may lawfully collect. Part II turns to Fourth Amendment
doctrine, first explaining how warrant-requirement exceptions and Fourth Amendment
exemptions so often render inapplicable the constraints traditionally imposed on searches and
seizures, and then exploring the powerful investigative tool this collection authority represents in
light of the dearth of Fourth Amendment use restrictions. In Part III, I make the case for treating
some queries as searches and explain how the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s (FISC)
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jurisprudence regulating government surveillance programs can provide a model for
implementing this doctrinal shift. As I have argued elsewhere, the FISC has at times imposed
limits on database queries that, while not explicitly based on constitutional foundations, were
clearly motivated by Fourth Amendment-related concerns such as individual privacy and
freedom from arbitrary government intrusions. In devising a means of imposing on database
queries requirements for ex ante review, cause, and particularity in the surveillance context, the
FISC has provided a blueprint for what a broader Fourth Amendment use-restriction regime
might look like. Part IV then explains why the use restrictions I advocate must be constitutional
requirements, rather than simply statutory or regulatory rules. The Article will then briefly
conclude.
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We Only Spy on Foreigners: The Myth of a Universal Right to Privacy and
the Practice of Mass Extraterritorial Surveillance
The digital age brought with it a new epoch in global political life, one neatly coined by
Professor Howard as the “Pax Technica”. In this new world order, Government and industry are
“tightly bound” in technological and security arrangements which serve to push forward an
information and cyber revolution of unparalleled magnitude. While the rise of information
technologies tells a miraculous story of human triumph over the physical constraints that once
shackled him, these very technologies are also the cause of grave concern. Intelligence agencies
have been recently involved in the exercise of global indiscriminate surveillance, which purports
to go beyond their limited territorial jurisdiction, and sweep in “the telephone, internet, and
location records of whole populations”. Today’s political leaders and corporate elites are
increasingly engaged in these kind of programs of bulk interception, collection, mining, analysis,
dissemination, and exploitation of foreign communications data, that are easily susceptible to
gross abuse and impropriety.
While the human rights community continues to adamantly uphold the myth system of a
universal right to privacy, in actuality the Pax Technica has already erected a different
operational code in which “our” right to privacy and “theirs” is routinely discerned. This
distinction is a common feature in the wording of electronic communications surveillance laws
and the practice of signals intelligence collection agencies, and it is further legitimized by the
steadfast support of the laymen general public.
In this piece I will offer some push back to this human rights agenda, trying to justify, in a
limited sense, certain legal differentiations in treatment between domestic and foreign
surveillance. These justifications, as I will show, are grounded in practical limitations in the way
foreign surveillance is conducted both generally, and in the digital age more specifically. I will
further make a controversial claim, that in fighting this absolutist battle for universality, human
rights defenders are losing the far bigger war over ensuring privacy protections for foreigners in
the global mass surveillance context. Accepting that certain distinctions are in fact legitimate,
would create an opportunity to step outside the bounded thinking of a one-size- fits-all European
Court of Human Rights surveillance jurisprudence, and would allow a much needed conversation
on what tailored human rights standards might look like for foreign surveillance activities.
My analysis proceeds in three parts. In the first section of my paper I examine the myth system
and the operational code surrounding foreign surveillance. I compare the arguments raised by the
vast majority of the international community and legal scholarship as they relate to privacy
protections and the principle of non-discrimination, and compare them with the vast practice of
States in the organization of their foreign surveillance apparatuses. I then present the way this
debate is reflected in a ground-breaking case, currently pending, before the ECtHR surrounding
GCHQ-NSA global mass surveillance programs.
In the second section of the paper, I shift the focus to various arguments that have been raised in
the literature to justify a differentiation in legal treatment between surveillance at home, and
surveillance abroad. I will first examine claims from the political right which seem to suggest
that privacy in the digital age has no intrinsic value of its own, or that it should not be
obligatorily applied in an extraterritorial setting. I will then address claims from the political left,
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who have erroneously focused their attention solely on historical biases to discredit the
differentiation. I will propose, instead, three new arguments in defence of the need for
establishing different legal regimes for domestic and foreign surveillance: (1) disparity in the
political-jurisdictional reach of State agencies; (2) disparity in the technological reach of State
agencies; and (3) disparity in harms from a potential abuse of power.
Having established that setting different human rights regimes for domestic and foreign
surveillance is something that States not only do, but something that they ought to do, the final
section of the paper offers a preliminary proposal for a new human rights framework for
extraterritorial mass surveillance programs, one which bridges the gap between the practice of
the spooks and the of deep-seated commitments human rights organizations.
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Reshaping Ability Grouping Through Big Data
(Joint Work with Tammy Harel Ben Shahar)
Ability grouping affects millions of students in the country daily. It shapes aspects of schooling
that are crucially important for students: the curriculum they study, the resources they receive,
the teachers who educate them, and the peers with whom they interact. Critics of ability grouping
insist that ability grouping reinforces educational inequalities, directing students from racial and
ethnic minorities or from poor families to lower tracks in which they receive inferior schooling.
In light of the biases that persistently plague traditional ability grouping, the recent introduction
of big data technologies in schools, and their utilization for ability grouping (Data Driven Ability
Grouping: DDAG) offers significant promise. It can potentially remove prejudice from
educational decisions, offsetting implicit biases that teachers may unknowingly hold. This
Article examines the promises and challenges that DDAG holds in terms of equality in
educational opportunity, and the ways in which law can intervene in order to ensure equal
opportunity.
EVAAS (Education Value-Added Assessment System) is a data based system that uses
algorithms for predicting students achievements and assigning them into different tracks in
eighth grade mathematics. In a recent study, teachers using EVAAS reported that the algorithm
assigned students to a high track that would otherwise not have been identified as suitable, and
increased shares of children from racial minorities and low socioeconomic status in the program.
Despite these encouraging findings, DDAG may also create unique challenges in terms of
educational equality. Studies concerning predictive analytics in other domains (e.g. crime
prevention) suggest that instead of eliminating biases, algorithms recreate them, because the
biases are embedded in the historical datasets the algorithms use for training. Additionally,
students from privileged backgrounds have better access to digital devises outside school, and
are more digitally literate, and are therefore likely to have a better digital profile than their
disadvantaged peers. Finally, DDAG may create new classes of children who are systematically
unfairly disadvantaged.
The fact that DDAG is believed to be scientific makes biases in it especially severe because it
may be used justify inequality, and because it is almost impossible to challenge. In the
educational context, this is especially troubling because in addition to assessing students’
abilities, the algorithmic predictions also constitute her ability by affecting the quality of
instruction she receives, the content of education, the level of peer effect, teachers’ expectations
of her and her own self-expectations.
After discussing the promises and challenges of DDAG, the Article argues that existing equal
protection doctrines – intentional discrimination, disparate impact and rational basis test – cannot
address the challenges of data driven ability grouping. Instead, the solution lies in integrating
technological solutions and legal regulation, both of which must be performed when designing
the algorithms.
The nature of algorithms, that enables designers to control the attributes taken into consideration,
their weight, and the result (e.g. how many members of a certain category are accepted into the
course) suggests that the involvement of legal and normative considerations at the stage of
design can be effective in improving the outcomes in terms of equality. In traditional assignment
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decisions performed by humans it is almost impossible to impose rules concerning which data to
use (and which to disregard) and to assign specific weight to each piece of information, and
biases are unavoidable. Thoughtful design of algorithms may be able to overcome these.
Information scientists have begun seeking technological solutions to algorithmic discrimination.
These include removing suspect attributes (such as race or gender) from the datasets and
manipulating historical datasets by removing biased decisions. Additionally, algorithms may be
able to completely reshape grouping by replacing the traditional criterion of academic
performance with other attributes that we were previously unable to ascertain, such as different
learning styles. Grouping according to these attributes may achieve effective teaching without
creating racial and class segregation.
The technological solutions, however, involve numerous normative decisions, that cannot be
divorced from legal doctrine. Law determines which classes are protected; whether unequal
outcomes constitute an actionable wrongdoing; and whether affirmative action is permissible.
These normative decisions must inform the efforts of algorithmic design. The Article therefore
offers a practicable framework for the integration of legal and technological solutions for ability
grouping in the information era.
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International Law
Faculty Discussant: Professor Steven Ratner (UM Law School)
Moderator: Yahli Shereshevsky (Grotius Research Scholar, UM Law School)
David Hughes (Osgood Hall Law School): “The Development and Use of
Informal Complementarity”
Chris O'Meara (UCL): “The Relationship Between National, Unit and Personal
Self-Defence in International Law: Bridging the Disconnect”
Michael Da Silva (University of Toronto): “The International Right to Health
Care: A Legal and Moral Defense”
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The Development and Use of Informal Complementarity
States that engage in the use of force often seek to legitimize their actions, both jus ad bellum
and jus in bello, through appeals to international law. Uses of force are defined as constituting
self-defence, they are held to be proportionate responses to an identified threat, targets are
defined as legitimate military objectives, and the appropriateness and legality of a particular
munition or means of attack is asserted. States have long appealed to the language, the
prescriptions, and accommodating interpretations of international law – formally and rhetorically
– as a means of self-endorsing the virtue of their actions within instances of international and
non-international armed conflict.
Equally, non-state actors, opponents of a military action, and groups or non-governmental
organizations who seek to hold a state that employs the use of force to account appeal to the
legitimizing effect and political currency of international law. This has caused David Kennedy
to remark that, “if law can increase friction by persuading relevant audiences of a campaign’s
illegitimacy, it can also grease the wheels of combat. Law is a strategic partner for military
commanders when it increases the perception of outsiders that what the military is doing is
legitimate.”
This proposed paper and presentation, titled The Development and Use of Informal
Complementarity: A Case Study of the 2008-2009 and 2014 Gaza Wars explores how state actors
are increasingly appealing to the principle of complementarity to insulate their actions from the
formal jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court as well as from general international
oversight. It introduces the notion of informal complementarity. This differs from formal
understandings of complementarity as commonly associated with Article 17 of the Rome Statute
and as used to assess the admissibility of a particular case that comes before the Court in The
Hague. Instead, engagement with this notion of informal complementarity may be understood as
occurring independent of ICC intervention, beyond the strictures of statutory requirements, and
outside considerations of a particular case or referral. It draws upon complementarity’s ordering
of domestic jurisdiction to assert that a state that takes measures to investigate and redress
alleged violations of international law has effectively and legitimately satisfied its international
legal commitments.
In developing this understanding, the paper explores the ways in which this notion of
complementary has been developed and engaged by Israeli and Palestinian actors in response to
the 2008-2009 and 2014 Gaza wars. These engagements alongside the increased likelihood that
the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICC will commence a formal investigation into “the situation
in Palestine” raises a host of formal legal questions. These range from the legality of Israeli and
Palestinian actions that occurred following the commencement of hostilities in Gaza to questions
of admissibility and associated considerations regarding Palestinian statehood. This paper,
however, assumes an agnostic approach to such associated legal questions. It is instead
concerned with the ways by which actors are drawing upon the proposed understanding of
complementarity and what the implications of these legal engagements, intended to legitimize,
are for the role of international humanitarian law upon the use of force.
These may be significant. Engagement with this amended notion of complementarity can
facilitate state efforts to forestall formalist measures. It often endeavours to nationalize
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international scrutiny of state actions during instances of armed conflict and upon the use of
force by demonstrating the appropriateness of domestic legal systems to ensure redress and
prevent against impunity should an accused violation of international law become substantiated.
Appeals to this pre-emptive, informal understanding of complementarity often focus on
individual indiscretions and violations. Such a limited focus, while justified in many instances,
promotes an understanding of international humanitarian law that favours redress of deviations
from state or military policy while neglecting (or insulating) the policies and state actions that
often drive such violations. Collectively, this threatens to promote a conception of international
humanitarian law that understands breaches as occurrences requiring redress not prevention. A
violation becomes something that must be rectified not avoided. This contributes towards an
ordering of international humanitarian law which preferences the achievement of military
objectives above the assurance of humanitarian obligations.
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The Relationship Between National, Unit and Personal
Self-Defence in International Law: Bridging the Disconnect
The issue of self-defence is one of the most contested areas of the jus ad bellum and of public
international law more generally. In particular, heated debates continue over the meaning of an
‘armed attack’, which is the trigger for the right of self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter). The well-known arguments highlight issues
associated with whether a threshold of violence is required before a right of self-defence arises,
the position of non-state actors in the equation and temporal issues pertaining to anticipatory
self-defence. The overwhelming majority of this academic purview has taken place at the state
level. That is to say the right of self-defence as it applies to states (national self-defence). This
approach represents only part, albeit an essential part, of the self-defence picture however. Much
less academic attention has been paid to how the right of national self-defence relates to, and
interacts with, the right of military personnel and their units to defend themselves. The
commentary that does exist is primarily provided by military and government lawyers in the
United States. There is a notable absence of input from jus ad bellum scholars. The International
Court of Justice has also provided little elucidation on this fundamental question. By focusing on
the state level, the jurisprudence has contributed to a fracturing of the jus ad bellum. The result is
an appreciation of the law that is far removed from those who face armed attacks on the ground,
in the air or at sea.
The disconnect between the right of states to defend themselves and the right of individuals and
units to do so, provides an incomplete picture of the right of self-defence. The purpose of the
paper is to highlight some of the problems associated with the focus to date on national selfdefence and to demonstrate how the right of personal and unit self-defence should and do fit into
the analysis. It seeks to offer some unified thinking regarding the jus ad bellum that properly
accounts for the position of the military. The hope is that this approach will contribute to
clarifying some of the controversies that have persisted since the right of self-defence was
expressly recognized by the UN Charter in 1945. The first part of the paper offers an overview of
the right of self-defence at the state, unit and personal levels, before proceeding to the
substantive issues where the disconnect is most apparent. These include whether the right of selfdefence should be viewed in a unitary manner or separately at the state and personal/unit level.
How attribution operates within this context is also reviewed, together with the gravity of
violence required before a right of self-defence becomes available at these different levels. The
difficulties posed by imminent armed attacks and the requirements of necessity and
proportionality is then examined, together with specific considerations relating to armed attacks
by non-state actors (NSAs).
What becomes clear when one considers these issues, is that much of the academic commentary
and jurisprudence to date is missing a piece of the puzzle. They tend not to account for how legal
norms operate on the ground and are then transmitted to the national level so that the right of
self-defence of military personnel and units are treated as constituent elements of the right of
national self-defence. To ensure therefore that there is no disconnect within international law, we
must be clear that the jus ad bellum treats self-defence in a unitary manner. There is only
national self-defence, although the legal rights of individual military personnel and units form
part of it. It is then the customary requirements of necessity and proportionality that govern what
the overall defensive response looks like. To avoid fragmentation within the jus ad bellum, and
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in international law more generally, we should therefore consider the range of consequences of
saying that a state has no right of self-defence against minor uses of force, or attacks by NSAs, or
armed attacks that are imminent. What is required is a holistic approach that looks at self-defence
in a consolidated fashion and considers how the different levels of self-defence work together.
The present disconnect needs to be bridged.
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The International Right to Health Care: A Legal and Moral Defense
While it may seem obvious that the international right to health includes a right to health care as
one of its constituent parts, recognition of an international human right to health care remains
contentious. Proponents of an international right to health care face at least three issues. First,
while the legal documents granting and specifying the content of the right to health refer to
health care goods and services, the majority of the right’s attendant duties relate to the social
determinants of health. Health rights advocates in the international sphere likewise highlight the
primary importance of social determinants. This suggests that any international right to health
care will have limited scope at best. Second, the normativity of the international right to health is
tied to the importance of certain benchmarks and indicators of health across populations, but
both recognition of health rights and access to health care only weakly correlate with improved
health outcomes. This suggests that the normativity of the international right to health may not
justify an international right to health care. Third, very few international rights require states to
create full systems to realize rights and the passages of international human rights law that
support a right to health care seem to require states to create health care systems. The purported
right to health care thus seems to fit uneasily with the structure of international rights. Stating
that a broad right to health must include a narrower right to health care is an insufficient response
to these concerns. In this work, I defend the international right to health care on textual and
theoretical grounds. If successful, this defense will address all three of the issues with existing
accounts.
My defense takes the form of two lines of argument. First, I argue that the plain text of the
documents that create and interpret the right to health supports the idea of a right to health care.
Contrary to critics’ claims, the relevant provisions often highlight the importance of particular
health care goods and services and create specific obligations for states to provide them. The
provisions explaining these requirements are not tied only to a concern with improved health
outcomes. They are also concerned with other foundational norms of international human rights
law, such as dignity and equality, which require provision of basic health care and fair
distribution of all health care resources. Second, in the alternative, I argue that even if the
international right to health does not obviously include a right to health care as a matter of
textual interpretation, such a right can be and should be developed from other international rights
that share the right to health care’s foundational concerns with dignity and equality.
Interpretations of those rights support this argument. International law that is not concerned with
human rights, including exceptions to the international intellectual property norms codified in
TRIPS, likewise suggest that international law in general recognizes the primary importance of
and right to health care.
These lines of argument explain how recognizing an international right to health care can avoid
the first two concerns above. I then go on to explain how this approach avoids the third concern.
While the international right to health care does require a minimally functioning health care
system, international human rights law is generally agnostic as to the form that this system would
take, allowing the right to coexist with the fundamental norms of state sovereignty undergirding
international law more broadly. This agnosticism also highlights the way in which the health care
system requirement is only a part of the broader right. The right is otherwise structurally
identical to other economic, cultural, and social rights. There are, moreover, signs that other
rights, such as the right to water, share the purportedly anomalous systemic duty element of the
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international human right to health care and good reason to think that this feature should be a
component of international rights. An outline of the argument for the content of the right, which I
developed in a full-length article elsewhere and outline here, confirms this consistency.
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